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20/20 Vision in the Long & Short-Termism Debate 
Anne Tucker* 
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, 
individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke 
emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually 
deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus 
regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board 
of directors versus the shareholders.1 Too long-term and it is myopia; too 
near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the 
debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.2 
Readers are likely familiar with the characterizations assigned to 
either end of the investment time horizon spectrum. Long-termism can be 
viewed as a source of sustainable growth, real economy investment, and 
durable value for retirement investors. It can also be portrayed as a practice 
of myopic, self-serving directors underutilizing existing corporate assets 
to protect their power and interests. Short-termism can be seen as the 
financialization of corporate management where earnings affect governing 
business plans and priorities, eroding the fundamental value and 
                                                     
*Anne M. Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. On June 4–
6, scholars gathered in Atlanta, Georgia for the ninth annual Berle Symposium. Each Berle symposium 
makes its own unique contribution to the study of the modern corporation, and the Berle IX 
Symposium follows in this tradition. The Berle IX Symposium focused on investor time horizons and 
drew deeply from the wisdom of law, finance, management, and neuroscience reinforcing the 
interdisciplinary tradition of the Berle symposia. Years before Charles O’Kelley and I collaborated on 
the Berle IX Symposium, I wrote him thanking him for his encouragement in big and small ways, his 
generous mentorship, and his work in generating timely scholarship on important corporate law topics. 
Those sentiments ring even truer today than when originally written. It is with big shoes to fill, and a 
sense of gratitude, that I introduce readers to this collection of scholarship on investor time horizons 
produced in conjunction with the Berle IX Symposium. 
 1.  See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-in the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 
68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013). 
 2. Presidential candidates even invoked investor time horizon concerns over short-termism in 
2016 stump speeches and policy reforms. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Imaginary Problem of 
Corporate Short-termism, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-imaginary-
problem-of-corporate-short-termism-1439853276; Jim Tankersley, Hillary Clinton has a very 
detailed plan for the economy. That may be a problem., WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/07/29/hillary-clinton-has-a-very-detailed-
plan-for-the-economy-that-may-be-a-problem/?utm_term=.c4658232f4da. 
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innovation of corporations. Short-termism can also generate corporate 
value for investors, deter managerial myopia or complacency, and 
encourage value-unlocking transactions. Navigating the debate feels like 
operating a broken compass with conflicting evidence and arguments 
pointing in different directions, producing more questions than answers 
and leaving one disoriented. The binary policy and value choices between 
long- and short-termism strike me as incomplete; investor time horizons 
are more nuanced than the black or white dichotomy of long- and short-
termism and their assigned value by supporters and detractors.3 
I have come to think of corporate time horizons in terms of 20/20 
vision—balanced and clear. Just as individuals need near and far sight to 
see correctly, corporate managers also need a clear view of the near and 
far term. The ninth annual Berle symposium—the Berle IX Symposium—
provided a platform for interdisciplinary scholars from law, finance, 
management, and neuroscience to share their understanding of the 
complexity, consequences, and interventions available in the investor time 
horizon debate. The Berle IX Symposium and this dedicated Issue are 
products of a collaboration between Charles O’Kelley of Seattle 
University School of Law’s Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, 
Law, and Society and Georgia State University College of Law. We 
invited Berle IX participants to contribute to three main inquiries, which 
are each addressed in more detail below: (1) What does it mean to be long- 
or short-termist, and what are the consequences of these time horizons?; 
(2) What are the different time horizons that exist among various investors 
and the theoretical and empirical bases for identifying the corresponding 
interests?; and (3) What governance tools could balance competing 
investor time horizons and help corporate management achieve 20/20 
vision?4 
Owen Jones of Vanderbilt Law School and the MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Law & Neuroscience was the aptly cast 
Keynote Speaker for Berle IX. Jones shared his seminal work on time-
shifted rationality, describing the mismatch between evolved information 
processing and current conditions that create irrational behaviors.5 Jones’ 
speech, the transcript of which is included in this Issue, introduced wisdom 
                                                     
 3. In Claire Hill’s article, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, she 
makes this point with more wit, passion, and force than I dare attempt. Claire A. Hill, An Identity 
Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475 (2018) 
[hereinafter Hill, An Identity Theory]. 
 4. Many of the resulting contributions are described below. A complete list of participating 
academics and presented papers can be found at https://law.seattleu.edu/centers-and-institutes/berle-
center/symposium/berle-ix [https://perma.cc/4VWC-ZDKZ]. 
 5. Owen Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics 
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. L. REV. 1141 (2001). 
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from behavioral biology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience fields 
relevant to temporal processing and choice. Jones’ undeniably 
interdisciplinary approach to time horizons, and his pleas for more 
research around a converging questions approach,6 set the tone for the 
Berle IX Symposium. I trust his transcript will do the same heavy lifting 
for this Issue by demonstrating the deep insight available when researchers 
invest in examining the underpinnings of problems and collaboratively 
explore them across disciplines. We have the same hope for this Issue of 
the Seattle University Law Review Berle IX. 
LONG-TERMISM, SHORT-TERMISM, & WRONG-TERMISM 
Readers looking to orient themselves to the long- and short-termism 
debate will glean insights from each contribution in this Issue. A few 
articles provide a particularly useful introduction for readers new to the 
field. Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe’s Institutional Investors, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value summarizes the financial 
literature, empirical evidence, and the theory on why some investors and 
firms are short- or long-term.7 In Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the 
Liability Structure of Investor Time Horizons,8 Andrew Verstein offers an 
incisive summary of the long- and short-termism debate; he summarizes it 
as “principally ask[ing] two questions.”9 First, he asks the empirical 
question of whether firms inefficiently telescope their investment 
timelines to satisfy impatient patrons—in particular, public shareholders.10 
Second, he asks the normative question of whether particular changes—
oftentimes changes to the scope of shareholder influence—are accordingly 
justified.11 Verstein challenges readers to think past short- and long-
termism and consider whether there is a third category, wrong-termism, 
which occurs whenever a particular time period is valued over the return 
offered.12 Elisabeth de Fontenay’s The Myth of the Ideal Investor provides 
a useful overview of the field and applies long- and short-termism tropes 
to different shareholder identities.13 
 
                                                     
 6. Owen Jones, Why Behavioral Economics Isn’t Better & How It Could Be, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (J.C. Teitelbaum & K. Zeiler eds, 2015). 
 7. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387 (2018). 
 8. Andrew Verstein, Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor 
Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 579 (2018). 
 9. Id. at 580. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See generally id.  
 13. Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 425 (2018). 
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Claire Hill’s contribution, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-
Term Investor Debate, highlights the complexity, interdisciplinary nature, 
and seeming intractability of the long- versus short-termism debate.14 Hill 
draws parallels between the debate about investor time horizons and other 
iconic corporate governance debates such as management versus activists 
and shareholder versus stakeholder.15 Hill argues that identity affects and 
in some ways impedes constructive debate because listeners weight proof 
against their prior beliefs.16 Hill urges that persuasion should be the 
starting point for building bridges between the two camps.17 Hill 
challenges readers to consider that “starting points are both as to matters 
of fact—matters that are, in principle, capable of being resolved one way 
or the other by some sort of empirical or maybe theoretical 
demonstration—and values, which are not capable of this sort of 
resolution.”18 Readers of this Issue can judge for themselves the proof, 
persuasion, and perspective provided in this collection of contemporary, 
interdisciplinary work on the complexity of investor time horizons. 
SHAREHOLDER FRAME TIME HORIZONS 
Identifying the shareholder interests driving time horizons is a matter 
of first principles in any investor time horizon discussion. Shareholders 
are not monolithic; they encompass a vast expanse of different identities 
and interests including hedge funds, mutual funds, pensions, retail 
investors, retirement investors, and everything in between. Berle IX 
participants examined shareholder identities, their different time horizons, 
and the theoretical and empirical bases for identifying the corresponding 
interests. 
For example, Elisabeth de Fontenay’s The Myth of the Ideal Investor 
unpacks three shareholder architypes—the major mutual fund, the activist 
hedge fund, and the private equity fund—and maps their attributes and 
behaviors to the long- and short-termism debate.19 Concluding that none 
of these archetypes fit the ideal, patient, value-maximizing shareholder, de 
Fontenay rejects corporate policy attempts to incubate one investor over 
another, instead preferring a diverse and robust corporate finance 
ecosystem.20 Noting the temporal time lag between problem identification, 
                                                     
 14. Hill, An Identity Theory, supra note 3.  
 15. Id. at 482–84. 
 16. See generally id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 480. 
 19. de Fontenay, supra note 13, at 428.   
 20. Id. at 425. 
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policy solution, and implementation, de Fontenay foreshadows policy 
questions raised by the third group of papers addressing interventions.21 
Rachelle Sampson & Yaun Shi’s contribution, Are Investor Time 
Horizons Shortening?,22 a distillation of their prior empirical,23 offers 
empirical evidence of short-termism. For example, Sampson and Shi point 
to trends of more transient (short-term) institutional investors from 1980–
2013 over dedicated (long-term) investors. Sampson and Shi investigated 
firm-level market discount rates using a capital asset pricing model with 
an assumed 5-year ownership and observed increasing market discounts at 
both the market and firm levels.24 Sampson & Shi also establish a 
relationship between market discounting and short-term oriented 
attributes. For example, transient (short-term) investors correlated with 
higher discount rates whereas dedicated (long-term) investors correlated 
with lower discount rates.25 Additionally, Sampson and Shi correlate 
higher discount rates with lower research and development spending, and 
higher analyst coverage.26 While Sampson and Shi acknowledge that not 
all firms are discounted the same (heterogeneity) and explore the reasons 
why some firms are discounted, despite similar attributes, more than 
others.27  Sampson and Shi telegraph their empirical findings to broader 
questions about optimal time horizons, optimal firm investments, and the 
relationship between corporate decisions and national economic health.28 
In Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 
Martijn Cremers and Simone Sepe focus on aggregate institutional 
investor behavior and introduce a taxonomy of institutional investor 
behavior derived from holding periods and activism.29 Cremers and Sepe 
focus on information asymmetry as an explanatory force in the long- and 
short-termism debate and ask why different firms attract institutional 
investors with different investment horizons and levels of shareholder 
activism.30 They demonstrate a relationship between increased stock 
turnover and poison pill adoptions, increased institutional investors, and 
firm age, which connects their observations to information asymmetry 
                                                     
 21. Id. at 427–28. 
 22. Rachelle Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, 41 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 543 (2018). 
 23. Rachelle C. Sampson & Yuan Shi, Evidence & Implications of Short-termism in US Public 
Capital Markets: 1980-2013 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837524. 
 24. Sampson & Shi, supra note 22.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Cremers & Sepe, supra note 7, at 389. 
 30. Id. 
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theories.31 Cremers and Sepe test the influence of staggered boards, 
finding no significant impact on institutional investors’ behavior but 
finding higher firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q when staggered 
boards are combined with patient institutional investors.32 Importantly, 
their article posits that staggered boards commit investors to a corporate 
strategy and facilitate boards of directors’ focus on long-term value 
creation.33 Cremers and Sepe’s contribution demonstrates the value of 
cross-discipline conversations. 
Harold Weston and Conrad Ciccotello, on the other hand, wield the 
heterogeneity of shareholders to argue against shareholder time horizons’ 
influence over corporate time horizons because any signal as to 
shareholder horizons is incomplete and unreliable.34 In Flash Traders 
(Milliseconds) to Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges of an 
Agency Theory Approach to Governance in the Era of Diverse Investor 
Time Horizons, Weston and Ciccotello further their argument by focusing 
on other temporal governance claims arising from bond, debt, and contract 
rights holders while highlighting the fiction that shareholders are corporate 
“owners.”35 Weston and Ciccotello propose an asset-centric vision of 
corporate governance and expanded directorial duties shaped in the image 
of trustees and as alluded to in in Re Trados Shareholder Litigation.36 
These contributions and the conversations during the Berle IX Symposium 
underscore how shareholder identities frame time horizon inquiries. 
DIFFERENT TIME PERSPECTIVES 
Several Berle IX contributions expanded the binary, temporal frames 
of long- and short-termism. For example, Jim Hawley and Jon Lukomnik, 
in The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern 
Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, encourage investors and researchers 
to seek beta—market performance as a whole—rather than the 
conventional investment model of seeking alpha—abnormal returns above 
market averages.37 Hawley and Lukomnik turn modern portfolio theory on 
its head by asserting that investment decisions can affect systemic risk and, 
                                                     
 31. Id. at 412–14. 
 32. Id. at 414–16. 
 33. Id. at 417. 
 34. Harold Weston & Conrad Ciccotello, Flash Traders (Milliseconds) to Indexed Institutions 
(Centuries): The Challenges of an Agency Theory Approach to Governance in the Era of Diverse 
Investor Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 615, 618–20 (2018). 
 35. Id. at 624–25. 
 36. Id. at 645; In Re Trados, Inc. SH. Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (2013). 
 37. Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right Questions? 
Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 449, 449 (2018). 
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therefore, change beta.38 In developing their beta theory, Hawley and 
Lukomnik, posit that early adopters of performance-enhancing measures, 
like environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG), may generate 
alpha.39 When “ESG out-performance is recognized by the larger market, 
alpha fades (it regresses to the mean), and ESG’s systemic impact becomes 
embedded in equity (and bond) pricing, it becomes part of market beta.”40 
It is clear in reading Hawley and Lukomnik’s work that beta matters; it 
comprises a significantly greater portion of investment returns than 
alpha.41 In connecting their work to time horizons, Hawley and Lukomnik 
note that beta investors would be permanent market participants with 
constant beta exposure, thus eliminating time horizon pressures driven by 
securities.42 Their piece imagines a post-time horizons investment world 
where beta management is the catalyst for markets, not time horizons. 
Frank Partnoy, drawing upon his book Wait43 in his symposium 
contribution, Specificity and Time Horizons, encourages focusing on 
investment time horizons separate from investor types or products.44 
Partnoy proposes four categories of time horizons: pre-conscious, fast-
conscious, slow conscious, and discounting.45 Partnoy’s time horizons 
span from less than one-half of a second (pre-conscious, algorithmic 
trading) to over a year (discounting).46 Temporal categories are related to, 
but not dependent upon, investor attributes.47 Partnoy argues that focusing 
on the time buckets themselves may help illustrate the appropriate role of 
interventions and policy.48 For example, pre-conscious and fast-conscious 
time horizons may call for more regulation with decreased private ordering 
and greater reliance on bias, whereas slower time categories may be better 
suited for private ordering solutions.49 Partnoy links his intuitions about 
time categories to juridical doctrines that alternate between short-term 
(e.g., zone of insolvency, Revlon) and long-term (e.g., the business 
judgment rule).50 Disclosed time categories could aid investors in 
                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 457. 
 41. Id. at 449. 
 42. Id. at 461. 
 43. FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART & SCIENCE OF DELAY (2013). 
 44. Frank Partnoy, Specificity and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525 (2018). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 535–37. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 538. 
 50. Id. (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)). 
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identifying temporally matched investments and managers if investment 
products made time world disclosures.51 
In Federalism of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement 
Plans, William Birdthistle, focuses on retirement investors.52 He writes, 
In an America in which workers must save—and invest those 
savings—in their own retirement accounts without substantial 
assistance from pensions or Social Security, the critical time horizon 
is the length of the lay-investor’s career. In those four decades or so, 
Americans must amass and deploy a nest-egg that will help them to 
survive the remaining two decades or so in retirement. The challenges 
of this task are enormous.53 
Firmly fixing the investment time horizon around the working life of 
retirement investors, Birdthistle proposes a federally sponsored thrift 
saving account as a retirement saving solution.54 Birdthisle offer a well-
constructed blueprint for the plan with automatic, opt-out contributions; 
simulated market scrutiny and competition to keep fees lows because of 
the size; and an appropriate focus on maximizing savings for the investors, 
not profits for the financial intermediaries.55 Birdthistle’s piece illustrates 
the reach of investment time horizon governance questions as an 
increasing percentage of American workers save for retirement through 
securities investments and what it is at stake if the wrong balance is struck. 
Returning to Andrew Verstein’s Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, 
and the Liability Structure of Investor Time Horizons, he offers a third 
category to the short- and long-term debate: wrong-termism. Verstein 
defines wrong-termism in thought process rather than time, as occurring 
whenever decision-makers value a specific time horizon regardless of the 
ultimate return. Verstein identifies three sources of wrong-termism, which 
emanate from (1) investors as either impatient or irrationally patient, (2) 
assets such as debt, Research and Development (R&D) investment or 
dividends, and (3) market sources such as activism and market demand.56 
Verstein explores specific interventions and focuses on the potential of 
liability transfers through fund de-risking.57 
                                                     
 51. Id. at 539. 
 52. William A. Birdthistle, Federalism of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, 
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 367 (2018). 
 53. Id. at 367. 
 54. Id. at 370–75. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Andrew Verstein, Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor 
Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 579, 594 (2018). 
 57. Id. at 608. 
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TIME HORIZON INTERVENTIONS 
Caroline Flammer, in Long-Term Executive Compensation as a 
Remedy for Corporate Short-Termism, translates her empirical work in the 
management and strategy literature.58 Flammer posits that long-term 
executive compensation addresses time-based agency conflicts that arise 
when managers’ time preferences are misaligned with those of the 
shareholders.59 Newly adopted long-term compensation plans, including 
restricted stock, restricted options, and long-term incentive plans, are 
correlated with abnormal (high) returns, increased return on assets and net 
profit margin, increased R&D expenditures, increased patents and patent 
citations, and increased stakeholder engagements.60 Flammer’s work 
connects private ordering solutions through employment and 
compensation contracts to the public policy questions of optimal corporate 
time horizons in decision making and resulting firm value. 
In Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A 
Proposal, Lynn Stout and Sergio Gramitto propose a universal fund—a 
donation-based equity fund in which all U.S. citizens would receive a 
share—as a means to align management time horizons with the time 
horizons of investors invested in the market as a whole.61 The proposed 
blueprint for the universal fund outlines funding sources (donations), 
management, voting rights, and transferability of universal shares.62 Stout 
and Gramitto’s universal fund would address more than investor time 
horizon conflicts, as it would also address systemic problems such as 
income inequality, the need for corporate innovation, and the costs of 
negative corporate externalities.63 They write: 
[G]overnments are not the only institutions that can solve collective 
social and economic problems . . . . Many of today’s corporations 
rival nation-states in weight, influence, and reach. Collectively they 
control tens of trillions of dollars in assets and affect hundreds of 
millions of customers, employees, and shareholders. Indeed, the 
                                                     
 58. Caroline Flammer, Long-Term Executive Compensation as a Remedy for Corporate Short-
Termism, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 419, 420 (2018) [hereinafter Flammer, Long-Term Executive 
Compensation]. For Flammer’s empirical work in management and strategy, see Caroline Flammer & 
Pratima Bansal, Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression 
Discontinuity, 38 STRATEGIC MAN. J. 1827 (2017). 
 59. Flammer, Long-Term Executive Compensation, supra note 58, at 420.  
 60. Id. at 421–22. 
 61. Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto, Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: 
A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 551 (2018). 
 62. Id. at 555–58. 
 63. Id. at 559–69. 
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corporate sector can be analogized to a kind of parallel state or 
shadow government that touches all our lives, and on a daily basis.64 
More than a thought piece, Stout and Gramitto paint a thought-
provoking image of corporate securities leveraged for public good. 
Jennifer Hill’s Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International 
Stewardship Code offers an international perspective on the shareholder 
narrative and a path forward in the long- and short-termism debate.65 Hill 
focuses on stewardship codes, which provide a framework to constrain 
board power through encouraged shareholder votes, proxy access, and 
increased activism.66 Hill contrasts the United States perspective on 
investor time horizons and shareholders’ appropriate governance roles to 
those in the United Kingdom and Japan, as exemplified through their 
stewardship codes.67 Hill’s piece demonstrates the breadth of jurisdictions 
incorporating stewardship codes, naming nineteen countries with 
stewardship codes helpfully organized around the initiating party behind 
the code: regulators, industry participants, and investors.68 Hill embraces 
a positive view of shareholder activism as an integral component of the 
corporate governance system.69 
Interventions—of framing and policy—abound in the other works 
already mentioned. Weston and Ciccotello envision directors as trustees 
after shedding the scaffolded fiction of shareholders as capable of having 
a time horizon, as owners, or as principals of the corporation.70 Elisabeth 
de Fontenay advocates for no regulatory intervention or preference for 
certain investors, instead letting the “eco system” of financial markets 
thrive.71 Frank Partnoy frames the issue around time categories, not 
investor-driven time horizons, and would encourage disclosures of these 
buckets and let investors match themselves with the right temporal 
window.72 Birdthistle endorses a federal thrift-saving account as a tool to 
protect retirement investors’ saving time horizons.73 Readers can access 
full accounts of all suggested interventions in the individual articles. 
                                                     
 64. Id. at 552. 
 65. Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2018) [hereinafter Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist]. 
 66. Id. at 497–98. 
 67. Id. at 511–21 (2017); Fin. Reporting Council, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE, July 2010; The 
Council of Experts on Japan’s Stewardship Code, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS: JAPAN’S 
STEWARDSHIP CODE, Feb. 26, 2014, 1–2. 
 68. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist, supra note 65, at 505–09. 
 69. Id. at 521. 
 70. Weston & Ciccotello, supra note 34, at 634–39. 
 71. de Fontenay, supra note 13, at 425.  
 72. Partnoy, supra note 44, at 539–40. 
 73. Birdthistle, supra note 52. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Berle IX presentations and colloquy among all attendees shaped 
my thinking on time horizons and helped produce the resulting articles that 
are in conversation with one another. Each article contributes its own 
perspective, evidence, and proposed interventions regarding investor time 
horizons. This collection of articles, as a whole, is greater than any 
contribution alone and provides an excellent primer for those new to 
questions of investor time horizons as well as an advanced, 
interdisciplinary examination of the issues for those who are already 
experts. We owe a debt of gratitude to the contributing authors for sharing 
their insights with us in this Issue. 
 
